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Smallpox vaccined commonly in research laboratories. Non-highly attenuated strains of VACV are
potentially pathogenic in humans, and VACV vaccination and biosafety level 2 facilities and protocols are
currently recommended for vaccinated laboratory workers in the United States who handle non-highly
attenuated strains of the virus. Despite this, laboratory-related VACV exposures continue to occur and a
number of recent instances of VACV infection in non-vaccinated laboratory workers have been documented.
We provide a discussion of the usage and risks associated with VACV in laboratory research.
Published by Elsevier Inc.BackgroundThe practice of immunizing with orthopoxviruses dates back over
200 years, in which the concept of vaccination was introduced by
Edward Jenner, to protect against variola virus infection, the causative
agent of smallpox. While it is not entirely clear what orthopoxvirus
was ﬁrst used for vaccination practices, vaccinia virus (VACV) was
eventually (if not initially) used as the viral agent for smallpox
vaccination, and its successful usage was largely responsible for the
global eradication of smallpox. Similarly, a natural reservoir for VACV
has yet to be identiﬁed and the origins of the virus are not known
(Baxby, 1977); explanations for the origin of VACV include (i) the
possibility that this was a zoonotic virus that has since gone extinct in
nature, (ii) that VACV was artiﬁcially derived from another orthopox-
virus through serial passage during vaccine production, and (iii) that
VACV may be a recombinant between variola and the original species
of orthopoxvirus that was used for vaccination (Binns and Smith,
1992; Shchelkunov et al., 2005). Genetically, VACV is closely related to
horsepoxvirus, however, the presence of gene disruptions in the
horsepox genome, that are intact in the VACV genome, does not
support the origin of VACV from horsepox (Tulman et al., 2006).
Vaccination with VACV provides long-lasting protection against a
variety of orthopoxviruses, including variola and monkeypox viruses
(Fine et al., 1988; Jezek et al., 1987, 1988). Among human vaccines,se of the authors and do not
se Control and Prevention.
ol and Prevention, 1600 Clifton
3111.
nc.VACV is unique in that it is delivered as a live, non-attenuated virus, by
puncture of the skin overlying the deltoid with a bifurcated needle.
Because of this, adverse events following vaccination are known to
occur, particularly among those with high risk conditions, such as
individuals with eczema, atopic dermatitis, or other skin conditions,
individuals who are immunocompromised or pregnant, and those less
than 1 year of age (Casey et al., 2006; Cono et al., 2003; Wharton et al.,
2003). Secondary transmissions to close contacts of vaccinees can also
occur. Out of 37,901 volunteers vaccinated under the US Department
of Health and Human Services preparedness program, 722 nonserious
adverse events and 100 serious events, including 85 hospitalizations,
were reported (Casey et al., 2005). Similarly, in a study of laboratory
workers receiving VACV vaccine, a wide variety of post-vaccination
symptoms were identiﬁed, althoughmost common symptoms tended
to be relatively mild (Baggs et al., 2005). In August 2007, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) licensed the new-generation ACAM2000
vaccine, which is now used in place of the Dryvax vaccine, in the
United States (CDC, 2008) and clinical trials suggest similar safety, as
well as efﬁcacy (Greenberg and Kennedy, 2008).
VACV in laboratory research
VACV is commonly used in modern molecular biology research.
Fig.1 shows cumulative yearly numbers of publications (fromNational
Library of Medicine's Pubmed database) with ‘Vaccinia’ in the title or
abstract. While numbers of publications have increased slightly over
the past decade, it is apparent that VACV usage has long been well-
established in laboratory research. Consistent with this observation,
VACV is used in the laboratory for a wide variety of purposes. As an
example, we classiﬁed all abstracts, with ‘Vaccinia’ in the title or
Fig. 1. Number of abstracts with ‘Vaccinia’ listed in the title or abstract, by year of
publication (National Library of Medicine's Pubmed database).
Fig. 2. Publications with ‘Vaccinia’ in the title or abstract, January–June 2008 (National
Library of Medicine's Pubmed database). Review articles and articles not in English were
excluded.
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basis of the role of VACV in the research (Fig. 2). These include both
studies involving VACV that are directly related to the understanding
of orthopoxviruses, as well as usage of VACV as a functional tool for
other areas of research.
In terms of research directly related to orthopoxviruses, the largest
proportion of VACV-related studies fall in the area of basic virology
(25% of abstracts). Other areas of research directly related to
orthopoxviruses, that commonly involve VACV, include studies
involving immune response to VACV infections, studies involving
experimental orthopoxvirus vaccines, studies on anti-orthopoxvirus
drugs or compounds, and studies related to public health issues
surrounding orthopoxviruses.
As shown in Fig. 2, nearly half of all studies involving VACV are not
related to orthopoxvirus research, but instead use VACV as a research
tool. These types of studies can be broadly grouped into two areas:
studies that use VACV as a protein expression or antigen delivery tool
for basic immunology research (22% of abstracts) and studies that use
VACV as a backbone for expression of foreign antigens for develop-
ment of vaccines against unrelated agents (25% of abstracts).
VACV serves as an effective vector in the expression of foreign
proteins for a variety of reasons. First, VACV infects a variety of cell
types and results in high levels of protein expression. Additionally,
viral replication occurs in the cytoplasm, and thus does not necessitate
nuclear processing and transport of RNA. Finally, straight-forward,
well-developed systems currently exist for the generation of recom-
binant VACV (Moss, 1996). Currently, most recombinant VACV strains
are generated through insertional recombination in the viral thymi-
dine kinase (TK) locus, resulting in a recombinant TK-minus viral
strain (Chakrabarti et al., 1985; Mackett et al., 1984; Moss, 1996).
While the widespread use of TK-minus strains of VACV clearly
demonstrate that this gene is nonessential for viral replication, studies
do suggest that abrogation of TK function results in a modest
attenuation in virulence. For instance, Buller et al. (1985) observed
lower levels of infectivity and virulence of TK-minus strains of VACV in
micewhen delivered by intracerebral and intraperitoneal inoculations
and similarly, Lee et al. (1992) observed a decrease in intracranial
virulence in TK-minus strains of VACV. It should be noted, though, that
both studies reported similar viral titers for wildtype and TK-minus
strains on the skin, following intradermal inoculation (Buller et al.,
1985; Lee et al., 1992). Additionally, human infections with TK minus
strains of VACV following laboratory-related exposure have beenwell-
documented (2008; Jones et al., 1986; Lewis et al., 2006;Mempel et al.,
2003; Openshaw et al., 1991), indicating that recombinant TK-
insertion strains of VACV are still pathogenic in humans.A VACV strain is considered non-highly attenuated if the virus
maintains the capacity to replicate productively in mammalian cells.
Numerous non-highly attenuated strains of VACV currently exist. Of
central importance to current laboratory research is the Western
Reserve (WR) strain of VACV which was selected by serial intracer-
ebral passage in mice, for neurotropic potential. Other strains used in
the laboratory commonly are related to the New York City Board of
Health (NYCBH) strain, from which the Dryvax and ACAM2000
vaccine strains, as well as VACV WR, were derived (ATCC, 2008;
Wokatsch, 1972). In contrast, attenuated strains of VACV do not have
the capacity to replicate in mammal cells. Of note is the modiﬁed
vaccinia Ankara (MVA) strain, which is able to infect and result in
protein expression, but not replicate, in mammalian cells (Sutter and
Moss, 1992), and may serve as a possible alternative in the future to
the currently licensed VACV vaccine (Phelps et al., 2007).
Laboratory safety and VACV infections
Because non-highly attenuated strains of VACV are pathogenic in
humans and handling virus in the laboratory presents a possible risk
of infection, safety guidelines have been developed. As a vaccine, VACV
has been shown to be highly efﬁcacious in generating protective
immune responses against both smallpox and monkeypox, and
furthermore, studies indicate robust VACV-speciﬁc immune responses
in humans following vaccination (Amanna et al., 2006). Therefore,
pre-exposure vaccination with VACV is a primary intervention that
can prevent or minimize the effects of accidental exposure in the
laboratory. Consistent with this observation, the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends VACV vaccination for
laboratory workers in the United States who handle cultures or
animals contaminated or infected with non-highly attenuated VACV
strains, at least every 10 years (Rotz et al., 2001).
In addition to vaccination, the usage of at least Biosafety Level 2
practices and facilities are currently recommended for the manipula-
tion of viruses or animals infected with non-highly attenuated VACV
strains (2007). This includes the usage of proper personal protective
equipment, including gown, gloves, and eyewear protection when
procedures have the risk of splash, proper laboratory facilities and
safety equipment, proper decontamination of infectious material, and
proper animal facilities (2007).
Despite the availability of vaccination and worker adherence to
safety procedures, laboratory-acquired VACV infections do occur and
3Minireviewhave been well documented in the literature. Inadvertent exposures
have occurred through needlestick accidents or eye splash (2008;
Jones et al., 1986; Lewis et al., 2006; Loeb et al., 2003; Mempel et al.,
2003; Moussatche et al., 2003; Openshaw et al., 1991; Wlodaver et al.,
2004). Laboratory-acquired VACV infections have commonly involved
recombinant viruses, which express foreign proteins (2008; Jones et al.,
1986; Lewis et al., 2006; Mempel et al., 2003; Openshaw et al., 1991)
produced from non-highly attenuated strains, such as WR (2008; Jones
et al., 1986; Lewis et al., 2006; Mempel et al., 2003; Moussatche et al.,
2003; Openshaw et al., 1991).
There exists no formal surveillance system in place, within the
United States, for instances of laboratory-related orthopoxvirus
exposures or infections. However, the Poxvirus Team at the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has been contacted on a
number of occasions in recent years regarding instances of labora-
tory-related orthopoxvirus exposures (Table 1). The majority of these
instances have involved VACV (typically WR) harboring a foreign
gene in the TK locus. Exposure to VACV most commonly occurred
through accidental needlesticks or through eye splash accidents. In 6
recent instances, exposure resulted in VACV infection, and 4 of 6
infections resulted in subsequent hospitalization. Infections com-
monly involved fever and large focal areas of painful induration,
erythema and severe swelling around the inoculation site. Hospita-
lizations occurred to assess the need for surgical or medical
intervention. Five of the 6 cases involved infection of the hand or
digits, and the remaining individual had ocular and facial involve-
ment. None of the six infected laboratory workers had met the ACIP
vaccination recommendation for working with non-highly attenuated
VACV in the laboratory.
Discussion
VACV is commonly used in laboratory research and the occurrence
of laboratory-related VACV infections has been documented pre-
viously (2008; Jones et al., 1986; Lewis et al., 2006; Loeb et al., 2003;
Mempel et al., 2003; Moussatche et al., 2003; Openshaw et al., 1991;
Wlodaver et al., 2004). In recent years, we have received a number of
reports of laboratory-related VACV exposures and infections. Addi-
tionally, laboratory-acquired VACV infections commonly have been
the result of TK-minus strains of virus. Because studies in mice have
suggested that inactivation of the VACV TK locus results in decreased
virulence (Buller et al., 1985; Lee et al., 1992), it may be perceived there
is not a risk of infection associated with handling a TK-minus VACV
strain; however, it is apparent that TK-minus strains of VACV do
maintain pathogenic potential in humans.
Because we currently do not have an estimate on the number of
laboratories, or researchers who are potentially exposed to non-highlyTable 1
Laboratory-related orthopoxvirus exposures reported to CDC, 2005–2008
Year State Virus (strain, if known) Met A
2005 CA Vaccinia No
2005 FL Vaccinia (rabbitpox) Yes
2005a CT Vaccinia (recombinant WR) No
2006a PA Vaccinia (recombinant WR) No
2006 CT Vaccinia
2007a IA Vaccinia (recombinant WR) No
2007 NM Vaccinia
2007a MD Vaccinia (recombinant WR) No
2007a NH Vaccinia (recombinant WR) No
2007 MA Vaccinia (recombinant NYCBH) No
2007 MO Monkeypox Yes
2008 GA Vaccinia Yes
2008 CA Vaccinia (recombinant WR) No
2008 NH Vaccinia (recombinant WR) No
2008 VA Vaccinia (recombinant WR) No
2008 FL Vaccinia Yes
a Detailed account of case provided elsewhere (2008).attenuated VACV strains, or the actual number laboratory-associated
VACV infections that occur, it is not possible to accurately assess the
overall risk of VACV infection, associated with laboratory work.
However, the observation that a large number of exposures, and all
recent infections, involve individuals who did not follow the ACIP
recommendations for vaccination warrants consideration for a
number of reasons. It is apparent that many researchers are hesitant
to be vaccinated, because it is perceived that the risk of adverse events
associated with vaccination is higher than the risk of working with
VACV. While the risks associated with vaccination are thoroughly
described to those considering vaccination, the beneﬁts of receiving
vaccination are often overlooked. There are a number of reasons that
researchers should consider vaccination:
1. Vaccination involves controlled delivery of the virus to the skin
overlying the deltoid. This is a region of the body that can easily
tolerate swelling without compromising function or causing
signiﬁcant pain. Accidental infection on other parts of the body
(e.g., hand or digit) can result in severe pain and swelling, and
possible long-term sequelae. Furthermore, many would con-
sider the cosmetic effects of a vaccination scar on the deltoid to
be less objectionable than scarring on another part of the body,
such as the hand, eye, or face, which are locations commonly
associated with accidental infection.
2. Vaccination involves inoculation with a controlled dosage of a
well-characterized virus strain. By contrast, laboratory-related
exposures can result in the delivery of a high titer of virus, as
well as delivery through an atypical route, such as deep
injection or ocular inoculation. Furthermore, laboratory studies
commonly involve recombinant VACV strains, which have the
potential to result in altered viral virulence or artiﬁcially
modulated immune response to the virus.
3. Adverse events associated with vaccination are generally mild
and severe adverse events are rare. For instance, 0.22% of
vaccinations administered under the US Department of Health
and Human Services preparedness program resulted in hospi-
talization (Casey et al., 2005). By contrast, 4 of the 6 (66%) recent
laboratory-acquired VACV infections reported to CDC resulted
in hospitalization.
4. Although the risk of exposure can beminimized by handling the
virus under proper laboratory conditions and using proper
techniques (for instance, the usage of eye protection can prevent
ocular exposure), it is often not possible to completely eliminate
the risk of accidental exposure to VACV. Personal protective
equipment cannot provide complete protection from needle-
stick accidents, which account for a large proportion of VACV
exposures.CIP vaccination? Nature of accident Result in infection?
Eye splash No
Eye splash No
Needlestick Yes (hospitalization)
Needlestick Yes
Eye splash No
Needlestick Yes
Animal care facility No
Needlestick No
Needlestick Yes (hospitalization)
Needlestick Yes (hospitalization)
Needlestick No
Animal care facility No
Eye splash No
Eye splash No
Unknown Yes (hospitalization)
Tube leakage No
4 Minireview5. The possibility exists for inadvertent secondary transmission of
VACV from an infected individual. Because of potential delays
between laboratory-related exposure and recognition of symp-
toms, laboratory workers may put contacts, such as family
members and healthcare workers, at risk for infection.
Conclusion
The eradication of smallpox through the administration of VACV
vaccine is one of the greatest public health achievements in history.
VACV remains an important virus today for laboratory-based research,
in the study of virology, immunology, and in the development of novel
vaccines. However, VACV is potentially pathogenic in humans, and
laboratory-acquired infections continue to occur. Although adverse
events have been associated with VACV vaccination, post-vaccination
symptoms tend to be relatively mild, and the ACIP currently
recommends VACV vaccination for laboratory workers who handle
non-highly attenuated VACV strains. While the highly attenuated
MVA vaccine is not currently licensed in the United States, laboratory
workers will hopefully beneﬁt from this vaccine in the future. The
usage of proper safety measures, including administration of VACV
vaccine, can minimize the risk of conducting research which involves
this virus.
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